Abraham Lincoln understood that the U. S. Constitution broadly endowed him with the opportunity for leading his countrymen as their agent of political change. Stephen Skowronek called this agency a battering ram; indeed … “presidents disrupt system, reshape political landscape, and pass to successors leadership challenges that are different from the ones they faced.”i Skowronek believes this presidential force persistently transforms American politics, creates regimes with different accomplishments and disappointments. The president as chief executive must compete with the other two branches to establish order on his terms. Skowronek uses a deterministic four-cell matrix for demonstrating how presidencies from the Federalist John Adams in 1797 to the Democrat Bill Clinton in 1993 compare with one another based upon time resistant attributes. Transformative presidencies have changed America over her short constitutional history and Americans will enjoy the leadership of another reconstructive president as he or she rejuvenates an unhinged regime.
"Think anew and act anew."
After
a brief explanation of Skowronek’s famous matrix, I will spend the
balance of my essay on the reconstructive presidents, especially
Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) and Ronald Reagan. These two remarkable
presidents surely operated in modern presidencies which were a far
cry from Thomas Jefferson’s reconstruction because his White House
staff numbered three and Reagan’s, over five hundred.
Nevertheless, Skowronek argues that these three presidential greats
are superbly similar because he compares presidents not in secular
time but in political time. Therefore, context determines why
presidents react as they do more than personage. John Sloan
describes our presidents as willful agents of “institutional
imperatives” and this has induced most of them to conform to one of
four patterns of politics—reconstructive, articulation, preemption,
and disjunctive.ii
The
widest warrants of authority inure to reconstructive presidents.
They hear the call to repudiate a failing regime and construct a new
one. While they are opposed to a vulnerable regime, the preemptive
presidents are opposed to a resilient one. These preemptive
presidents have transgressed Constitutional framework at times in
their quest for loopholes, places where they can steal some of the
issues. Bill Clinton’s shenanigans are a vindication of this cell
of the typology. Affiliated presidents practice policies of
disjunction or articulation: disjunction if they continue with a plan
that cannot meet the problems they face and articulation when they
find it easy to follow the policies of their predecessors and fit the
regime together in better ways. If only the articulators like Lyndon
Johnson could have continued their successes, the special interests
will be served and commitments honored. The reconstructive regime
follows after a disjunctive presidency and leaves for articulators a
regime ripe for implementation. The hallmark being in reconstruction
where crucial coalitions pass much needed legislation. These four
cells capture interactive changes as we have moved through our
political time (1789 to the next regime). This well thought out
structure allows political scientists to compare presidents in
different time periods facing similar leadership challenges.
The
New Deal and the Reagan Revolution each dealt successful with
economic maladies their respective predecessors could not fathom.
Hoover was thoroughly successful in his endeavors before he arrived
on Pennsylvania Avenue, and Carter has performed magnificently since
departing from the Oval Office. Each of these two modest men had and
has an extremely high IQ. Their presidential political identities in
vulnerable regimes are pegged as disjunctive but history teachers
teach a harsher critique: that Hoover and Carter were presidential
failures responsible for the economic tragedies which occurred on
their watches. What went wrong?
Hoover entered office in 1929 riding the
wave of Republican euphoria. Suddenly in September 1929 a
cataclysmic stock market crash occurred. Americans panicked as their
jobs disappeared even though Hoover arm-in-arm with notable bankers
and businessmen pledged publicly that everything was fundamentally
sound. The president innovatively set up the Federal Farm Board and
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Unfortunately, he
miserly metered out the funds, despite the fact that the federal
government could borrow money, and he made concessions with foreign
governments on war debts while simultaneously distributing the
equivalent of nickels and dimes to the fifteen million unemployed
Americans by 1932. Hoover asked for volunteer activities when
coercive legislation was needed. The depression plunged Americans
into despair. Hoover said prosperity was just around the corner but
no one was buying a used car from this man. Apparently by the time
he declined to veto the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff, he was
politically stultified. This paved the way for the charismatic FDR
who would save the banks and preach “happy days are here again”
even though the depression continued through three New Deals until
World War II.
Carter followed the debased
administration of Richard Nixon who had to turn over the reins to
Gerald Ford who tried to get matters back on a constitutional course.
Carter like Hoover was an engineer. Carter also was going to
proactively administer the presidency under the old formulas.
Skowronek says Carter like Hoover before him made the “reification
of technique” his primary justification for action. The emphasis
is on technique over substance. Carter wished to maintain political
order that was crumbling. He tries to move on many fronts without
constructing a clean vision. This sealed Carter’s fate as being
fuzzy. He looked like an outsider; Skowronek explains, “… the
antinomies so precariously balanced in Carter’s leadership posture
were sent crashing into one another.”iii
Carter was a liberal Democratic president who would engineer
readjustments of the operating system of liberalism as he
administered it. He was criticized for not coming up with anything
of substance. No one in Washington seemed to care much for Carter’s
brand of governing. When inflation surged and the prime rate went
through the roof, Carter’s policies became completely unhinged.
Reagan came into power in 1981, staking his claim to certain warrants
with a clear vision (no fuzziness) as to how to exercise power to
secure his place in history for his reconstructive regime. Reagan
repudiated Carter’s existing politics.
Periodically
America needs reconstruction presidents to put us back on track.
Hoover’s and Carter’s failures gave way to FDR’s and Reagan’s
greatest successes. These presidents help the political system adapt
to changing conditions. They transformed the political regime when
the challenges became more insistent. The old formula does not
work—as Lincoln congealed, “think anew and act anew.”
According to Sloan, “Champions of the new order will extol a
visionary construct which will solve the nation’s problems and
bring about a much better life for the majority of its citizens.”iv
Once elected the reconstructive president does not have to solve all the problems. The fact that he is solving problems brings him to the fore of the political stage and dramatically increases his chances for further repudiations. The power to reconstruct hinges on the power to repudiate. They must be great communicators because they must convince the public that their vision is the reflection of the public good in a grand sense expounded upon by the ancient masters such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
Typically, these leaders are optimistic and passionate about their direction. They are able to develop a groundswell of partisanship; their cohorts ascribe to their moral precepts. These presidents are not trying to make the existing machinery work efficiently. They sometimes appreciate nuances of their constitutional underpinnings, sagely recognizing that the Founding Fathers envisioned several pathways to the top of the mountain “to see the shiny city on the hill.” These presidents are builders and if their successors have challenges following through on their rejuvenated regime then so be it. They galvanize support on both sides of the aisles of Congress so as to move the nation off of the insecure moorings and unto a brand new aircraft carrier (no wonder one is named the USS Abraham Lincoln). Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan seized the authority and used the power of the White House to dismantle a crumbling regime and “imagine the better life that can be launched by a new, dynamic regime.”v
There
was a sixty-eight year gap between Lincoln and FDR. Skowronek calls
this the “waning of political time” and attributes this to the
thickening of government as the Office of the Presidency expanded; he
even somewhat surprisingly concludes his excellent book with a
prediction that future presidents will be preemptive because
presidential reconstruction is now (by Clinton’s administration)
out of the question. Reagan came only thirty-six years after FDR,
and his presidency certainly had far more advisers than FDR’s
administration. As will soon be discussed, Reagan was able to use
bargaining and going public in his large, complex institutional
presidency and convince sufficient numbers of his opponents so that
his critical legislation was promulgated.
An
understanding of regime is germane to all that Skowronek has given
us. Sloan revised Skowronek’s concept of regime, maybe in one
sense that Skowronek did not elaborate that much on his concept of
regime. The U. S. Constitution allows regime change without violent
revolutions. Regimes depend on ideology: FDR attempted to set up a
liberal regime and Reagan’s reforms were conservative. The
reconstruction president wishes his regime to become
institutionalized. In order to do this, he had to discredit the
floundering regime of his predecessor. The pressures for change had
built up and fortunately an inventor rather than a field engineer
comes in with fresh, salable ideas. These presidents change the
prevailing philosophies and belief.
As mentioned hereinabove, Hoover helped
everyone (even fed some cattle in Arkansas) but he could not reach
out to the man in the streets and under the bridges. Sloan argues,
“[A] viable regime must depend on both self-interest and idealism
for its viability.”vi
Experts will challenge the new reconstructive regime builder about
whether or not his proposals are compatible with the traditions and
mores of the constitutional republic. Accordingly, the
reconstruction never completely destroys the old regime nor builds a
totally new one. The reconstructionist must legitimate his vision
for the voters and their elected representatives. Sloan defines
regime as: “…a temporary institutional arrangement, supported by
a political philosophy and an electoral coalition that dominates the
policy agenda for a period of time.”vii
FDR
as Reagan later on relied on a potpourri of advisers. FDR constantly
generated competition among this smorgasbord of advisory consultants.
Multiple solutions to different problems percolated to the top of a
detailed decision model. FDR cleverly and sometimes deviously used
his motley crew of advisers. For example, when businessmen abandoned
him, he dramatically turned to labor, although labor unions were
divorced from his patrician heredity, and embraced their cause,
culminating in the sweeping Wagner Act of 1935 that created the
National Labor Relations Board. FDR was capable of bold strokes; he
took us off of the hallowed gold standard. When questioned about the
propriety of such a sweeping change, FDR quipped that he surely
believed that American democracy was strong enough to back its own
currency. FDR successfully shifted policy directives while he kept
his rhetoric forceful and convincing. He was the optimistic activist
who could see as surely as Hoover could not that private resources:
bankers, insurance executives, railroad barons, and businessmen would
not provide security for Americans. His fellow Americans were
unemployed without the safety nets of social security and federal and
state unemployment insurance. FDR and Reagan were able to round up
key allies at opportune times and turn adversity into triumph by
rewarding supporters, preparing them for further partisanship.
How
could Reagan display one upmanship on FDR who fashioned a response to
the enigmatic depression which had befuddled America’s finest
economic thinkers. Reagan simply came in with a pure vision to lower
taxes, revitalize national defense, and accomplish this by lessening
the governmental bureaucracy. Reagan said the tax structure was
holding America back. He changed our defense strategy. This is what
Reagan did in response to Carter’s “no easy answers.”
With all his acting and rhetorical
skills, Reagan could still not pass constitutional amendments
outlawing abortion, allowing prayer in the schools, or requiring a
balanced budget. Carter had allowed inflation to get a grip on the
economy. Reagan immediately recognized in his first one hundred days
that he could not stay the course, he must drastically and quickly
alter it. Very soon into his administration the political writers
espoused Reagan’s virtues, and this is not surprising when
comparisons were made with Carter’s last two years in office. A
centerpiece of Reagan’s presidency was that his administration
produced more jobs than the larger Western Europe. Part of his
legacy is that this was done at the expense of unbalanced budgets and
large federal deficits rather than supply-side economic policies.
He installed Paul Volcker as head of the
Federal Reserve Board. Volcker attacked inflation head-on and Reagan
gave him the necessary support in the face of initial problems.
Reagan focused on economic policy primarily. He used television for
going public—this revitalized the institution. His pragmatic
advisors used these public pronouncements in order to ascertain where
Reagan wanted to go. Although some of this advisers were mercurial,
Reagan was able to keep them focused and on course, and if they
wavered in their fidelity then he replaced them. Unlike Hoover and
Carter Americans would buy a used car from this man!
He was the knight in shining armor who
rescued the damsel (economy) in distress. He played the role of the
crusading outsider (which he was) to perfection. Americans
remembered the last Republican president before Reagan as “tricky
Dicky”; they adorned Reagan as the great American citizen. He not
only went public but also bargained effectively without surrendering
his hardliner economic priorities. He exuded confidence in his
ability to negotiate. In his budget negotiations he swayed an
opposition Congress in a fine-tuned manner and to the necessary
degree. He could take some punches like Jack Dempsey could.
Opponents might daze him but he did not take on Carter’s fuzziness:
he could bounce back with authority and power politics. His most
potent punch was his power to repudiate.
Reagan’s weakness was his aversion to
details. Political scientists and historians equate the Iran-Contra
blemish on his outstanding presidency the result of allowing certain
foreign service advisers to develop and manage a renegade
governmental entity right under the president’s nose. Skowronek
maintains that Reagan survived “…because in the political world
he had constructed, he was a leader with impeccable intentions who
occasionally made mistakes.”viii
Reagan’s “New Beginning” succeeded where the New Deal failed
by generating an economic recovery. It would be up to his successor,
George Bush (No. 41) to articulate Reagan’s regime. In a political
regime so complicated that it restricts political leadership, Reagan
with a rare combination of talents and instincts became our latest
reconstructive president.ix
There
is a stronger set of political institutions today so even
reconstruction presidents cannot undo the waning of political time.
Can reconstruction presidents still bring about political change?
Skowronek cautions his readers to look at the presidency since it is
here where the Constitution grants incumbents the opportunity to
legitimate themselves by ushering in changes. Polk frankly stated he
intended to be myself
president. FDR and Reagan aimed at multiple targets in a coordinated
visionary schema. These two successful leaders controlled the
political definition of their actions, looking forward to the legacy
they were inventing. Skowronek talks of presidents taking different
tests. In sum, the reconstruction presidents were confronted with
huge dilemmas, putting them to difficult tests. Lincoln saved the
Union and freed the slaves. Jefferson turned the focus back on the
people and away from the elitist aristocracy.
Jefferson had it easier than FDR and
Reagan because as political cycles repeat greater resistance comes
from interests threatened by order-shattering actions. They do not
want the way cleared for something new. The thicket of governmental
laws, rules, and regulations constricts presidential action.
Therefore, presidents on the threshold of great change must be able
to shift gears; they must bargain and they must talk publicly to the
American people. Their warrants may not be as dense today as in the
past, but authority is there and power can be appropriated. I still
think future reconstructive presidents will arrive on the scene
because a regime is never finalized. They will take command of their
resources and break up, break through, and break down the political
systems which have become unhinged. New eras of reconstruction are
not foreclosed. Further possibilities of regime building that will
strengthen American democracy remain open.
Submitted
by John F. Hinrichs on 29 June 2005.
i Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993), 6.
ii John W. Sloan, “Revising Skowronek: Reconstructive Presidents as Principal Agents of Regime Change” (paper presented at Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia, November 2002), 8.
iii Skowronek, 384.
iv Sloan’s paper, 9.
v Ibid., 29.
vi Ibid., 16.
vii Ibid., 28.
viii Skowronek, 425.
ix John W. Sloan, The Reagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 225-269.
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